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INSURERS' DUTY TO SETTLE-STRICT LIABILITY FOR
EXCESS JUDGMENTS: HAS THE TIME COME?
A contract for liability insurance usually provides that the insurer must
defend any lawsuit against the insured, for damages payable under the terms
of the insurance contract, but may settle any such claim or lawsuit.' The
permissive "may settle" clause has given little help to the courts on a question
of law which has bothered judges and commentators for most of this century
—what, if any, is the duty of the insurer with regard to settlement.2
 This
question frequently arises in the following fact pattern. An insured, who has
rather limited personal resources, takes out a liability insurance policy with
a $5,000 limit. An accident occurs and the insured is served with process in
a suit in which the plaintiff seeks $30,000 damages. The injured party then
makes an offer to settle for $3,500. The insurance company, which is con-
ducting the defense of the lawsuit pursuant to the provisions of the insurance
contract, rejects this offer and proceeds to trial. The insured suffers a judg-
ment of $7,500, of which the insurer is obligated to pay only $5,000. Insured
then initiates suit against the insurer to recover that part of the judgment
not satisfied by the insurance company. 5 It is now the task of the court to
determine on what basis the insurer will or will not be held liable for the
excess liability—that part of the verdict in excess of the $5,000 covered by
insurance. It is the intent of this comment to explore briefly the standards
presently imposed by courts when faced with an excess-liability problem, to
comment on two recent cases which expressed concern for the inadequacy of
present standards, and then to consider whether it is an appropriate solution
to the excess-liability dilemna to hold an insurer strictly liable for any excess
verdict subsequently rendered against the insured.
I. PRESENT STANDARDS
Although some early authority indicated that there was no duty in re-
gard to settlement,4 that approach was short-lived. 5 In recognizing that an
insurer has at least some duty in the matter of settlement, most courts point
1 The court in Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Co., 250 Iowa 1123, 97 N.W.2d 168
(1959), quotes a standard clause used by insurers to express their obligation in this
matter. The policy requires an insurer to "'Defend any suit against the insured alleging
such injury, . . . even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent; but the company
may make such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems
expedient.' " Id. at 1128, 97 N.W.2d at 172.
2
 For extensive discussion of this subject see Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955) ; 7A J.
Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice §§ 4711-13 (1962) ; Keeton, Liability Insurance
and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1136 (1954).
3
 This fact pattern is a simplified version of the facts in Blue Bird Taxi Corp. v.
American Fid, Cas. Co., 26 F. Supp. 808 (E.D.S.C. 1939) (applying S.C. law).
4
 Kleinschmit v. Farmers Mut. Hail" Ins, Ass'n, 101 F.2d 987, 989-90 (8th Cir.
1939); Schmidt v. Travelers Ins, Co., 244 Pa. 286, 289, 90 A. 653, 654 (1914). Although
there were no specific allegations of negligence or bad faith in those cases, the courts used
language which is sufficiently broad to be taken to mean that the insurer had no duty
at all in the matter of settlement,
5 See American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1932).
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to the position of trust and confidence which an insurer holds while exercising
its contractual privilege of exclusive control over the lawsuit.° The New
Jersey court, deciding for the first time in that state what standard should
be imposed on an insurer, emphasizes in typical fashion the sensitive position
held by an insurer and the consequent need to impose at least some duty in
the strategic area of settlement.
Search for the just rule must be engaged in with an under-
standing that the purpose of insurance of this type is to protect the
insured from liability within the limits of the coverage. And in
interpreting the policy, the courts cannot allow the insurer to
frustrate that purpose by a selfish decision as to settlement which
exposes the insured to and results in a judgment beyond the speci-
fic monetary protection. . . . 7
Despite cognizance of this need, courts have by no means been uniform in
their selection of a standard to be imposed on insurers. Courts frequently
consider the choice of a good-faith norm as opposed to a due-care standard
when deciding what test an insurer must meet. 8 Numerous writers have
similarly classified the jurisdictions under the headings of due-care and good-
faith.9 There is little value, however, in attempting to group the jurisdictions
simply under those headings because the standards applied are really far
more divergent." Furthermore, some commentators have even suggested
that despite the clear distinction in the wording of good-faith and due-care.
tests, the different jurisdictions tend to reach the same results in similar fact
patterns.11
A close examination of some of the standards applied reveals not only
the futility of a simplistic categorization of the tests but also the absence of
any consensus as to a sound, acceptable solution to the excess-liability
dilemna. As Professor Keeton has pointed out, there are really two distinct
issues to be decided by a court in ascertaining the standard of conduct to
which an insurer is to be held: (1) whether the basis of liability is bad faith
or negligence; and (2) what degree of consideration must an insurer give to
6 E.g., Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., IS S.W.2d 544, 547 (Comm'n
App. Tex. 1929),
7
 Radio Taxi Serv., Inc. v. Lincoln Mut. Ins. Co., 31 N.J. 299, 304, 157 A.2d 319,
322 (1960).
8 E.g., Georgia Cas. Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d 777 (1932); Cowden v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 389 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d 223 (1957).
9 E.g., Heaslip, Insurer's Failure to Settle, 12 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 85 (1963); Com-
ment, Insurer's Liability for Judgments Exceeding Policy Limits, 38 Texas L. Rev. 233
(1959).
10 But see Wilson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur, Co., 145 Me. 370, 76 A.2d 111 (1950). The
court states that on the question of "the duty of an insurer, if any, in the negotiation
of a settlement, there is a clean-cut conflict of authority whether liability may be
grounded in negligence, or exists only where fraud or bad faith is proved," Id. at 375,
76 A.2d at 113.
11 7A J. Appleman, supra note 2, § 4712; Comment, Insurer's Liability to Insured for
Judgments Exceeding Policy Limits, 7 Drake L. Rev. 23, 27 (May 1958); Comment,
Liability of Insurer for Judgment in Excess of Policy Limits, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 95, 100
(1949).
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the insured's interests in comparison with its own. 12 It would be meaningless
to classify jurisdictions only according to the position which they take on the
first issue. For example, among three jurisdictions which purport to hold the
insurer to a good-faith standard, one permits the insurer to consider its own
interest paramount in case of conflict of interest; 13 another requires that the
insured's interest be given equal consideration; 14 and the third insists that the
insured's interest be given priority."
A close examination of the standards applied also reveals that the em-
ployment of differently worded rubrics contributes to the present diversity.
For instance, although two jurisdictions purport to apply a negligence test,
one court questions whether the insurer exercised such care as an ordinarily
prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances,"
and the other tribunal asks whether a prudent insurer without policy limits
would have accepted the settlement offer." 7
Another factor militating against a simple classification of the standards
is the requirement, by some courts, of a combination of good faith and due
care from the insurer. Some of these jurisdictions impose a good-faith standard
on the insurer's decision whether to accept an offer of compromise, but also
include a due-care requirement in that standard by requiring an insurer to
make a reasonably diligent effort to ascertain facts before making any de-
cision as to settlement's Other jurisdictions insist on a combination of good
faith and due care without applying a heterogeneous standard. That is, these
courts insist that the insurer meet a dual requirement of two distinct stan-
12
 Keeton, Ancillary Rights of the Insured Against His Liability Insurer, 28 Ins.
Counsel J. 395, 396-97 (1961).
13 St. Joseph Transfer & Storage Co. v. Employers Indem. Corp., 224 Mo. App.
221, 231, 23 S.W.2d 215, 220 (Kansas City Ct. App: 1930).
14
 American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Nichols Co., 173 F.2d 830, 832 (10th Cir. 1949)
(applying Okla. law).
15 Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E. 346 (1933).
In this case, unlike St. Joseph Transfer & Storage Co., 224 Mo. App. 221, 23 S.W.2d 215
(Kansas City Ct. App. 1930), and American Fid. & Cas. Co., 173 F.2d 830 (10th Cir.
1949), where the courts talked only in terms of good faith, the court clearly holds that
in addition to a requirement of good faith an insurer must also meet a due-care standard
in the matter of settlement. The South Carolina court, however, does not utilize either
of the other courts' "good faith" tests as one of its two standards. Rather, the court states
that if an insurer's "interests conflicted with those of respondent [insured], it was bound,
under its contract of indemnity, and in good faith, to sacrifice its interests in favor of the
respondent." 170 S.C. at 292, 170 S.E. at 348.
I ° State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 346 F.2d 484, 488 (8th Cir. 1965)
(applying Ark. law).
17 Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
It should be noted here that Keeton has criticized the "equal consideration" phrasing
of an insurer's duty and has strongly recommended that the standard be altered. It was
he who suggested that the good-faith or negligence rules be phrased in terms of what "an
insurer with no policy limit applicable to the claim" would have done. Keeton pointed
out that it could be misleading for a court to require "equal consideration" for the
interests of the insured and insurer, and then to allow a decision as to settlement at which
the interests of one party would very definitely be sacrificed. Keeton, supra note 2, at
1146-48.
18
 E.g., Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 235 N.W. 413 (1931).
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dards. In these jurisdictions an insurer will be liable for the excess liability
if it violates either the standard that it exercise good faith throughout the
settlement stage or the standard that it act with due care. 19 Whether the com-
bination is of the former or of the latter type, it is clear that these standards
lend further support to the proposition that classification of the jurisdictions
into good-faith and due-care categories is inappropriate and that there is no
real consensus as to a standard to be imposed on insurers in the matter of
settlement.
II. RECENT CASES
Two courts recently expressed their dissatisfaction with standards cur-
rently imposed on insurers in the matter of settlement. Both were faced with
excess-liability situations and both concluded that there was ample room for
improvement in this area of the law. It is interesting to note that the two
courts imposed radically divergent standards on the insurer.
In Brochstein v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2° a federal district court ap-
plied New York law and relied on three 1920 cases in reaching its decision.
The court found that although New York's good-faith standard would
not allow an insurer to engage in fraud or dishonesty, there was no viola-
tion of the good-faith norm when the insurer pursued its own interest in
refusing to settle and did not consider the insured's exposure to excess
liability.21 Apparently, New York law does not require the insurer to give
equal consideration to the interests of the insured in deciding whether to
settle. The district court expressed concern for the inadequate protection of
the insured's interests, and it suggested that an insurer should be obligated
to appoint a lawyer for the insured who would represent solely the insured's
interests at the settlement stage. The court thought that such a measure
would be appropriate because there is "no open, safe and familiar mode of
dealing with . . . the need for a controlled arms-length discussion between
the assured and the insurer about their respective interests in the settle-
ment."22
In Crisci v. Security Ins. Co.,23 the Supreme Court of California was
faced with an extreme fact situation. The insured had $10,000 of insurance
coverage under a general liability policy. An accident occurred and claimant
12 Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E. 346 (1933),
2° 266 F. Supp. 223 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
21 Id. at 225.
22 Id. at 227. In developing its interesting solution for this bothersome area of law,
the court points out that this lawyer would be appointed to articulate and to advance
the insured's interest in an area formerly dominated by the insurer. The court believes
that the insurer could be obligated to appoint such a lawyer for the insured by reading
that duty into the insurer's covenant to defend, since the insurer assumed the obligation
to defend and since the most important aspect of most defenses is the negotiation of
settlement. Such an appointment would not only guard against a completely self-interested
decision by the insurer to go to trial, but also would encourage frank discussion of the
respective interests of insured and insurer in an area where insurers are often uncertain
as to their privileges and obligations.
For another interesting and novel suggestion, see Felton, Excess Coverage Bought
after the Accident? 1963 Ins. L.J. 517.
23 426 P.2d at 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (Sup., Ct. 1967).
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sued the insured for $400,000. Some time before judgment was entered, the
insurer refused an offer to settle for $9,000 even though insured offered to
pay $2,500 of the settlement amount. Judgment was then rendered against
the insured for $100,000. Holding that the insurer had breached its duty to
consider the insured's interests in proposed settlements, the California court
affirmed a judgment against the insurer for the excess liability and for $25,000
in damages as compensation for insured's mental suffering. The court here
imposed a standard on the insurer which must be placed at the opposite end
of the legal spectrum from the standard applied in Brochstein. Not only does
California speak in terms of reasonable care and prudence rather than in
terms of good faith, it also applies the test of "whether a prudent insurer
without policy limits would have accepted the settlement offer"24 to deter-
mine whether an insurer gave sufficient consideration to the interests of the
insured. In contradistinction to New York's test, the California rule is es-
pecially favorable to the insured. Even so, the California court is not
completely satisfied with its standard and intimates, in significant dictum,
that strict liability may well be the ultimate solution to the excess-liability
problem.25
III. STRICT LIABILITY
The strict liability rule would impose liability on an insurer for any
subsequent judgment if the insurer had previously refused an offer to settle
within policy limits. Although strict liability is receiving growing favorable
comment from writers, 26 who present it as a suitable rule in an area where
there has been no widespread agreement as to an acceptable norm, most
judicial comment has thus far been hostile. Numerous courts explain the
standard that they are applying either by pointing out that there is no abso-
lute duty to settle or by stressing that the contract does not require an in-
surer to be gifted with powers of accurate prophecy. 27 Such explanatory
language certainly can be interpreted as inimical toward a strict liability
approach. Furthermore, there are some early cases which explicitly reject
strict liability contentions.
In Kingan & Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co.,28 for example, it was argued that
the insurer has a duty to effect a settlement, if it can do so without exceeding
the policy limits, "regardless of the apparent merits of the claim or reason-
24 Id. at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
25 Id. at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
26 Since 1945 several commentators have recommended strict liability as an accept-
able solution to the excess-liability problem. Ertsgaard, Liability Beyond Insurance Policy
Limits, 1958 Ins. L.J. 404, 406-07; Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for
Settlement, supra note 2, at 1183-84 (one of four recommendations); Comment, Liability
of Insurer for Judgment in Excess of Policy Limits, supra note 11, at 101-02; Comment,
Excess Liability: Reconsideration of California's Bad Faith Negligence Rule, 18 Stan. L.
Rev. 475, 482-85 (1966) ; Note, Liability Insurer's Duty to Settle, 13 U. Chi. L. Rev.
105, 109 (1945); Note, Insurer's Refusal to Settle—A Proposal for Imposition of Lia-
bility above Policy Limits, 60 Yale L.J. 1037, 104142 (1951).
27 E.g., Radio Taxi Serv., Inc. v. Lincoln Mut. Ins. Co., 31 N.J. at 312, 157 A.2d
at 326; Cowden v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 389 Pa. 459, 470, 134 A.2d 223, 228 (1957).
28 65 Incl. App. 301, 115 N.E. 348 (1917).
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ableness of the sum demanded." 2" If the court accepted the contention that
an insurer must settle so long as the settlement offer was within policy limits,
and the insurer violated that duty by refusing to settle, it is safe to assume
that the insurer would be held liable for the immediate consequences of its
wrong—the excess liability. In effect then, the court was asked to impose
strict liability on the insurer. The court, however, refused to do so, saying that
an insurer may elect between settling and defending and that the insurance
company is not obligated to assume the risk of any future judgment should
it refuse an offer to settle and decide to defend the suit at trial.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has also rejected a strict liability
contention. In Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.," the court
expressed concern for the consequences of a rule which would require an
insurer to accept claimant's offer of settlement within limits or defend legal
proceedings at the risk of any judgment that might be recovered. The court
felt that such a standard would free the insured from liability for damages
in most instances and that such freedom would, in turn, have serious reper-
cussions. Utilizing reasoning which might well be challenged as unrealistic,
the court expressed its apprehension that an insured, freed of the risk of
liability, would have little incentive to defend against claims devoid of
merit and would tend to relax the ordinary "rules of prudence and vigi-
lance."31
In Blue Bird Taxi Corp. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co.,32 a federal
district court found that allowing an insured to demand, as a matter of legal
right, that the insurer settle within limits if the opportunity arose would
result in opening the door to fraud and would promote collusion in the
framing of actions for damages. Nor would the least of the pejorative
results be a great increase in premium rates.""
In view of this rather weak precedent rejecting strict liability and in
view of the dissatisfaction with present standards, it is not surprising that
the strict liability theory has been gaining momentum. Although most judi-
cial comment on strict liability has not been favorable, the California
Supreme Court stated in Crisci that "there is more than a small amount of
elementary justice"34 in that solution to the excess-liability dilemma. Since
1945, several writers have suggested it as an acceptable answer to the prob-
lem.35
 In the small, but growing, body of authority favoring strict liability
there are discernible four basic points which form the nucleus of the argu-
ment for that rule.
The first point in favor of strict liability is that it is an appropriate
standard in view of the nature and purposes of a liability insurance policy 30
There are five steps in reasoning to such a conclusion. First, the essential
2° Id. at 311, 115 N.E. at 351.
30
 92 Me. 574, 43 A. 503 (1899).
31
 Id. at 586-87, 43 A. at 506.
32 26 F. Supp. 808 (E.D.S.C. 1939).
33 Id. at 810.
34 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
3 ° Authorities cited note 25 supra.
3° See Crisci, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17 (dictum).
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purpose of liability insurance is to remove the risk of having to pay legal
judgments with one's own funds. Second, in all but exceptional circum-
stances," an insured is especially interested in avoiding the risk of excess
liability because an excess judgment would present the very situation that
liability insurance is supposed to avoid—having to pay a legal judgment
with one's personal resources. Third, one of the accepted modes of relieving
an insured from the risk of liability is settlement. Fourth, an insurer, con-
fronted with the possibility of excess liability, has only one means of pro-
tecting the insured's vital interest in avoiding the risk of an excess legal
judgment. That one means of protection is settlement within the policy
limits, if the opportunity arises. Fifth, an insurer's refusal to adopt that one
means of adequate protection and its decision to go to trial can be explained
only as a preference of its own interests over those of the insured. In such
circumstances, it is appropriate for the insurer to be liable for any subse-
quent judgment.
Reading this standard into a liability insurance policy would certainly
abolish excess-liability suits for an insurer's wrongful refusal to settle within
limits. Furthermore, such protection is consistent with the basic purposes
of liability insurance. It is relevant to point out, however, that a court trying
to determine a proper standard for the insurer is met with an explicit con-
tractual provision. Although desirable policy considerations should not be
excluded from the decision as to an insurer's duty regarding settlement, the
obvious meaning of the contractual language and the clear intent of the
contracting parties deserve a pre-eminent position in a judicial proceeding.
Thus, a court, impressed with an argument which stresses the purposes and
goals of the insurance contract, in advocating strict liability must also con-
cern itself with the explicit statements in the policy—must defend but may
settle—which certainly do not present the insurer's function regarding
settlement in strict, mandatory terms. Here, judicial action should await
some sound, convincing discussion which not only presents strict liability as
a theory consonant with the goals of liability insurance, but which also
presents strict liability as a reasonable reading of the "may settle" language.
A second argument for the acceptance of strict liability is that insurers
often abuse their fiduciary position in the matter of settlement and that
present standards do not effectively police the insurers in that sensitive
capacity." Here, an aspect to be emphasized is that, by reserving exclusive
control over settlement, the insurer has the insured's interests  within its
complete control, and there are, of course, very significant interests of the
insured at stake when there is an opportunity to settle within policy limits.
The most effective way, then, of protecting those interests is to penalize the
37
 There undoubtedly are exceptional situations where an insured would prefer to
run the economic risk of an excess judgment because of his interest in proving that he
was without fault in the accident. Such an instance might arise when an insured, who
has already suffered a large number of accidents, fears cancellation of the policy or a
'major increase in premiums unless he is able to acquit himself of fault in this particular
accident.
88
 See Ertsgaard, supra note 26, at 406-07; Note, Insurer's Refusal to Settle—A
Proposal for Imposition of Liability above Policy Limits, supra note 26, at 1037, 1041.
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insurer by means of strict liability whenever the insured's interests are
injured by a refusal of an offer to settle within the limits and a subsequent
excess judgment. Such a plan would insure proper protection for the insured's
interest in contrast to present standards, which entail difficulties in proof
and allow the insurer substantial leeway to prefer its own interest.
The third point is that the proposed rule is simple to apply, and avoids
the inherent practical problems in the application of the present standards. 39
It is readily apparent that a standard does not lend itself to efficient applica-
tion when a jury of laymen may be called upon to decide such a typically
nebulous standard as whether an expert in the matter of insurance claims,
who has rejected an offer to settle within limits, was acting like a prudent
insurer without policy limits. Nor are present standards applied in a facile
manner when a jury, completely unfamiliar with the settlement of law suits,
has to decide whether the insurer gave "equal consideration" to the interests
of the insured in determining whether or not to settle.
A fourth point in favor of strict liability is that it will not be substan-
tially more expensive than the present standards. Moreover, it can be argued
that even if somewhat higher premiums ensued, such a development is con-
sistent with public policy which favors a greater distribution of the risk. 40
These four arguments present the strict liability solution in its most
favorable light. To them should be added a fifth, in view of a significant
aspect of the Crisci case. The California court upheld an award of $25,000
for the mental suffering of the elderly insured, who attempted suicide on
several occasions, suffered periods of hysteria, and experienced a general
decline in physical health after suffering the excess-liability judgment. Al-
though another court has denied damages for mental pain and suffering
caused by the execution of an excess-liability judgment,'" it is possible that
damages for mental suffering could become an element of recovery in excess-
liability suits in states other than California. Naturally, if the strict liability
rule were accepted, an insured like Mrs. Crisci would not be subjected to the
mental suffering which may accompany the prospect of having to pay an
excess judgment and the insurer would not be subject to the financial threat
of liability based on insured's mental suffering.
Although the court in Crisci expressly refrained from investigating
whether there might be some countervailing considerations precluding adop-
tion of the proposed rule of strict liability, 42 and although most courts have
not expressly rejected strict liability as an acceptable solution, there is more
39 See Crisci, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17; Comment, Liability of Insurer for
Judgment in Excess of Policy Limits, supra note 11, at 100-01; Comment, Excess Liability:
Reconsideration of California's Bad Faith Negligence Rule, supra note 26, at 484.
It would be erroneous, however, to think that criticism of the workability of the
present standards originated with the proponents of strict liability. See, e.g., Appleman,
Duty of Liability Insurer to Compromise Litigation, 26 Ky. L.J. 100, 109 (1938).
40 Ertsgaard, supra note 26, at 407; Comment, Excess Liability: Reconsideration of
California's 'Bad Faith Negligence Rule, supra note 26, at 484-85; Note, Liability In-
surer's Duty to Settle, supra note 26, at 110.
41 Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Henderson, 82 Ariz. 335, 313 P.2d 404 (1957).
42 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
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to consider about strict liability than the advantages which were set out in
the five points above. There are at least three adverse considerations.
There is an initial rebuttal that liability policies are correctly construed
to impose only a limited duty in the matter of settlement. It is argued that
so long as an insurer complies with its duty of due care or good faith, an
insured should have no right to compel the insurance company to offer an
amount up to the limits of the policy in order to settle and protect insured
against an excess judgment. The rationale stressed here is that insurers are
in the business of trying to sell policies with high limits and that it would
be incongruous to require an insurer to bear the sank financial risk when
it sells a $5,000 policy and there is a $30,000 claim and a subsequent offer
to settle within policy limits, as when it sells a $30,000 policy to an insured
who is sued for $30,000. Behind such a rationale is an insistence that any
discussion regarding excess liability should entail a recognition that an in-
sured can readily secure all needed protection by purchasing a policy with
a high limit of liability on the insurer for relatively smaller additional
premiums."
Such an approach does not seem to recognize the very forceful point
that an insurer's fiduciary responsibility is significantly greater when the
limits are $5,000 and the claim may result in a judgment $25,000 in excess
of the policy limits, than when the claim is for $30,000 and the limits are
for $30,000. Nor should the fact that an insured could have purchased a
policy with higher limits lessen the insurer's extremely sensitive duty of pro-
tecting the insured's interests when there is an offer to settle within limits.
A second adverse consideration, which courts should ponder before
adopting a strict liability rule, is that, almost without exception, there is
recognition that such a change should be effected by legislation or by the
insertion of new terms into the policy." Professor Keeton stresses that these
two modes of change are proper. On the other hand, he states that adoption
of strict liability "is not reasonably open to the courts at the present time
because of the firmly established precedent to the contrary, and the fact that
the established precedent has been one of the assumptions on which the
premium rates have been determined for policies coming before the courts." 4"
This obstacle to court adoption of the strict liability rule is the product
of a reasonable reading of the insurance contract which numerous courts
have made over the past thirty years. The vast precedent to which Keeton
refers held that when an insurer contracted that it must defend but may
43 See American Cas. Co. v. Howard, 187 F.2d 322, 329 (4th Cir. 1951) (applying
S.C. law); Radio Taxi Serv., Inc. v. Lincoln Mut. Ins. Co., 31 N.J. at 304-05, 157 A.2d
at 322; Jarrett, Lawsuits for Wrongful Refusal to Defend or to Settle, 28 Ins. Counsel J.
58, 65 (1961).
44 Among the proponents set out at note 26 supra, only one commentator does not
explicitly recommend either legislation or writing new policy terms. That writer suggests
that the strict liability standard be read into the insurer's covenant to defend. Note,
Insurer's Refusal to Settle—A Proposal for Imposition of Liability above Policy Limits,
supra note 26, at 1042. Another commentator recommends change via legislation simply
because the courts are unlikely to adopt strict liability. Note, Liability Insurer's Duty to
Settle, supra note 26, at 110. See also Levit, The Crisci Case—Something Old, Something
New, 2 U. San Fran. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1967).
46 Keeton, supra note 2, at 1184.
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settle a claim, the insurance company was assuming a limited duty of acting
either with good faith or with due care in the matter of settlement—however
those terms may be defined. The reasoning behind such precedent would
certainly be inconsistent with an interpretation of the "may settle" language
which would require an insurer to be strictly liable for any excess judgment.
There is, however, more than simply a vast body of judicial precedent in-
consistent with the strict liability rule. There has been a noticeable lack of
support, from judicial or nonjudicial sources, for the proposition that a strict
liability rule may reasonably be read into the specific contractual language
regarding defense and settlement. In effect then, a court, which contemplated
the adoption of strict liability, would be confronted not only by extensive
precedent interpreting the settlement language in a manner incompatible
with strict liability but also by a marked absence of reasonable recommenda-
tions as to the manner of reading strict liability into the "may settle" lan-
guage.
A third point, which has not been explored thoroughly but which may
well be decisive, militates against acceptance of the strict liability rule. It
is the possibility that the present balance of negotiating power between the
claimant and insurer will be upset to such an extent that the cost of settle-
ment will greatly increase. It has already been noted that there is an argu-
ment in favor of strict liability, namely, that it will not be substantially more
expensive than present standards and that cost is therefore not an obstacle.
None of the writers, however, has considered explicitly the effect of strict
liability on settlement negotiations and some have been content to dismiss
the cost problem in cursory fashion." It is not inconceivable that the effect
of such a rule on those negotiations could be significant when the problem
is raised in the following terms. There are, undoubtedly, many instances in
which an insured's personal resources are negligible or so difficult to attach
that the claimant is interested only in the amount that he can collect from
the insurer. In such a situation, the settlement negotiations would be carried
on and settlement offers would be framed with a keen eye toward the limited
amount sought to be collected from the insurer. In short, when a claimant
is seeking to make an attractive settlement offer to an insurer, who is aware
that the policy limits are the most that claimant can hope to collect, the
claimant is apt to frame his settlement figure well within policy limits. On
the other hand, there would be a strong tendency for that same claimant to
frame his settlement offer so as to be just under policy limits, if the jurisdic-
tion required an insurer to pay any subsequent judgment if the insurer had
previously refused any offer to settle within limits. In more concrete terms,
if the claimant could only hope to recover the $5,000 policy limit at trial,
his settlement figure may well be in the $2,500-$3,000 range. Yet, if he
knows that the full $30,000, which he is seeking, must be paid by the insurer
if claimant wins at trial and insurer has rejected a settlement within policy
limits, there is a good chance that claimant will demand $4,900 because of
the disadvantageous position of the insurer. In this type of situation, then,
a very significant interference with the balance of negotiating power of the
46 See authorities cited note 40 supra.
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insurer and of the claimant is quite likely. It is evident then, that regardless
of whether the problem of judicial adoption of strict liability is resolved so as
to justify judicial implementation of the rule rather than legislative effectua-
tion of that standard, serious and exhaustive consideration of that rule's
effect on settlement negotiations and on other factors which significantly
influence the cost of insurance should precede the enforcement of a strict
liability rule.
Satisfactory resolution of the excess-liability dilemma would be an
admirable accomplishment for the legal profession. A solution like strict
liability, however, should be considered with extreme caution. It achieves
a desirable social goal by shifting the risk of loss from the insured to the
insurance industry in those deplorable excess-liability situations where there
was an opportunity to settle within limits. Nevertheless, important questions
such as the appropriate means of effectuating that rule and the ultimate
effect on insurance costs remain to be resolved.
WILLIAM A. RYAN, JR.
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